Autopoietic Social Systems Theory

Autopoietic Social Systems Theory

Niklas Luhmann, who studied at Harvard University under Parsons's supervision in the 1960s, was clearly influenced by Parsons's work. This is visible in the cybernetic influence on Luhmann's work first of all, seeing the social system as an 'organic' system, capable of:

•        Self-production

•         Systems produce their own basic elements

•        Self-organization

•         Systems create their own boundaries and internal structures

•        Self-referencing

•         System elements refer to the system itself; and they are closed systems, they do not deal directly with their environments, but rather with representations of their environments

Drawing on developments in systems theory and biology, the nucleus of Luhmann’s autopoietic social systems theory is based on the fundamental feature that characterizes living systems, i.e. “autonomy”.

Self-Production-Organization-Reference

Autonomy

Autonomy in living systems is a feature of self-production (autopoiesis), meaning that they produce, and reproduce, themselves. A living system is properly characterized only as a network of processes of production of components that is continuously, and recursively, generated and realized as a concrete entity (unity) in the physical space, by the interactions of the same components that it produces as such a network (Maturana, 1999). Therefore, an autopoietic organization is a living system, where every-thing that takes place is subordinated to the realization of its autopoiesis, otherwise it disintegrates.

In fact, this philosophy in many respects broke away Luhmann from Parsons's structural functionalism. One such break is Luhmann's turn away from action towards communication. For Luhmann (Arnoldi, 2001):

§  Social systems are not systems of action but of communication.

§  Social systems are systems that 'make sense' of their environment.

Communication

Since, Parsons's GAIL paradigm leads to a view of action which is external from the point of view of the actors; Luhmann also remains external to actors radically challenging the whole scope of the classic structural functionalism.

In fact, for Luhmann social systems are no longer primarily systems of action but sense-making (observing) systems. Hence, his work is neither on how actions are coordinated into action systems, nor an attempt to describe social order through actors' experiences of others. Instead, it concerns meaning-processing social systems, excluding the actors' point of view but including sense-making. As a result, at the core of Luhmann’s theory of social systems processes of communication plays an empirical event that happens in the world (Fuchs, 1999), i.e. “a social system is a communicative process that makes sense of its environment in a way rather similar to the way the world is made sense of in a conscious process”  (Luhmann, 1995).

Self-Reference, Process and Double Contingency

Luhmann develops the theory of autopoietic social systems one step further by linking sociology with other sciences. This approach enables him to integrate a flow of new research into his theory by linking the concept of self-reference (a process where a structure or pattern appears in a system without an imposing central authority or external element) to autopoiesis, which is borrowed from science of mathematics to combine a notion of meaning or sense with notions of self-reference and autopoiesis (Arnoldi, 2001), i.e.:

Ú Human beings constitute part of the environment of the social system.

Ú Yet, proper unit or component of an autopoietic social system are not the individuals, act, or social role but instead communication (i.e. utterance).

Ú Such communication in the form of an utterance is central to the existence of society and is indispensable (i.e. communication is not simply an exchange of messages; it is the very act of existing and living.)

Ú However utterance is not permanent. Thus, if society is built around such temporary utterances, which disappear almost instantaneously, it follows that society is autopoietic and must continuously reproduce itself, by reproducing the components (utterances) that produce it.

The concept of autopsies serves as an excellent framework for the self-reference process. It goes further beyond traditional open or closed system as simultaneously open and closed. The internal autopoietic organizational process by which the system ensures its reproduction are closed to external environments and to other social systems. Yet, simultaneously, the system’s borders remain open to exchanges of energy and information from its external environment. Furthermore, even subsystems such as law or medicine can have their own relationship with the external environment, perhaps independently of the relationships of larger society (Ritzer, 2005).

This model allows Luhmann to surpass the Parsonsian school of thought that is preoccupied with system internals and maintenance by addressing the problems of structural-functionalism and by focusing on self-reference and contingency (i.e., the fact that things could have developed differently) in systems. 

Double Contingency

So far, I have built the case that Luhmann society is an autopoietic system. In following sequential logical arguments, I aim to define the firm integration in this relationship and answer how is society possible and how they function":

Ú Systems are always less complex than their environments

Ú Communication comprises the most basic element of society, i.e. anything that is not communication is part of a society’s environment (e.g. biological and psychic systems). 

Ú Environments rely on meaning, where the meaning emerges only because a specific action is different from other possible actions.

Ú Therefore, every communication must consider the way in which it will be received (i.e. double contingency).

Ú Social structures (e.g., roles and norms):

o   Make it more likely that communications will be understood by both sender and receiver. 

o   Give communications some continuity over time. 

Ú Thus double contingency:

o   Provides much of the impetus for the evolution of social systems where the outcomes of evolution are not predefined yet it is a set of processes that includes variation, selection, and the stabilization of reproducible characteristics.

In summary, foundational aspect of Luhmann’s theory of social systems (i.e. namely the theorem of double contingency) analyses take their starting-point from some classical questions. How do two individuals who come face-to-face bridge the gap between them and establish a relation to one another? How does the other-orientation in each of the participants emerge and evolve in a social relation? How is action coordination between ego and alter possible (Vanderstraeten, 2002)? At a basic level, through these questions emergence of Luhmann’s social systems thinking searches for answers to “how is society possible and how they function?”

The Differentiation of Society

Luhmann creates a distinction between social and psychic systems, where he considers society as a first order social system, whereas function systems like the economic and the legal system are viewed as second order social systems or societal subsystems. Society as a first order social system differs from second order social systems insofar as it has no other social system as an environment; society's environment consists only of natural and psychic systems (human beings).

However, this distinction between social and psychic systems does not mean that there are no connections between them. Without the other, neither one of these two system types would have evolved. But Luhmann maintains that in essence they are distinct (Arnoldi, 2001); since principal feature of modern society is the increased process of system differentiation as a way of dealing with the complexity of its environment. This is accomplished through the creation of subsystems in an effort to copy within a system the difference between it and the environment. Therefore, the differentiation process becomes a means of increasing the complexity of a system, since each subsystem can make different connections with other subsystems. It allows for more variation within the system in order to respond to variation in the environment. Increased variation facilitated by differentiation not only allows for better responses to the environment, but also allows for faster evolution, which is defined sociologically as a process of selection from variation; the more differentiation (and thus variation) that is available, the better the selection (Ritzer, 2007).

Based on this notion, Luhmann states that; “if we conceive of systems as open-systems-in-environments, structural changes have to presuppose non-coordinated events in systems and environments. Non-coordinated events are contingencies in themselves both with respect to their coincidence and their conjunctive causality. The contingent coincidence contingencies (and this is a plausible definition of chance) may lead to structural changes given the conditions stated by the theory of evolution” (Luhmann, 1982).

At the most general level, Luhmann’s “differentiation of society” suggests that when modern social systems, confronted with environments rich with possibilities, functions reduce complexity (Colomy, 1983):

1.     To avoid being overwhelmed by complexity, procedures (e.g. schematized contingencies) are developed for organizing environmental input.

2.     To make the contingency of their modes for reducing complexity more explicit and devise self-conscious procedures for regulating their dealings with the environment, they become reflexive.

3.     To ensure tolerance for endemics of "bottlenecks" and imperfect coordination invariably produce deviance and conflict in modem systems which Luhmann describes as "loosely joined" entities.

In short, Luhmann’s view upholds that differentiation is a system's way of dealing with complexity of and changes in the environment. If a system is to cope with complexity it must be complex and allow for alternatives, possibilities of variation, and internal conflict, indeterminate, contradictory, and flexible to deal with changes in its environment; produce internal environments - different for each subsystem, and external environment - same for subsystems and system, and evolve and through a process of selection.

Finally, Luhmann also explores four forms of differentiation that occur:  segmentary (subsystem reproduction), stratificatory (hierarchy of status), center-periphery (link between segmentary and stratificatory systems), and functional differentiation (the most complex and problematic for modern society, since it means that problems are often displaced from the level of society to one of its subsystems (e.g., the problem of ecology) (Ritzer, 2005).